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We investigate the possibility of having someone carry out the work of executing a function for
you, but without letting him learn anything about your input. Say Alice wants Bob to compute some
known function f upon her input x, but wants to prevent Bob from learning anything about x.
The situation arises for instance if client Alice has limited computational resources in comparison
with mistrusted server Bob, or if x is an inherently mobile piece of data. Could there be a protocol
whereby Bob is forced to compute f(x) blindly, i.e. without observing x? We provide such a
blind computation protocol for the class of functions which admit an efficient procedure to generate
random input-output pairs, e.g. factorization. The cheat-sensitive security achieved relies only upon
quantum theory being true. The security analysis carried out assumes the eavesdropper performs
individual attacks.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd
Keywords: Secure circuit evaluation, Secure two-party computation, Information hiding, Information gain
versus disturbance, Quantum cryptography
I. INTRODUCTION
In the traditional secure two-party computation
scenario[2, 11] Alice has secret input x, Bob has secret
input y, and both of them wish to compute f(x, y).
The function f is of course well-known to the two
parties; the usual example is that of two millionaires
who wish to compare their wealth without disclosing
how much they own[11]. Most protocols for secure
two-party computation are symmetric with respect to
the computing power each party should carry out during
the execution. In these scenarios, if Alice knew Bob’s
input y she could compute f(x, y) on her own without
having to invest more computing power. Entering a
secure two-party computation together with Bob will
in general not help in diminishing Alice’s computing
power needed to evaluate f , and this is simply not the
aim pursued. In fact, all implementations known by
the authors of this paper require both Alice and Bob
to invest more computing power than what is needed
for the mere evaluation of f . For instance in [2] each
gate performed by a party requires the other to per-
form the same gate, together with some extra encryption.
Unlike secure two-party computation, blind computa-
tion is fundamentally asymmetric. Alice is the only party
with a secret input x, Bob is the only one able to com-
pute f . Alice wants Bob to compute f(x) without him
learning too much about x. Thus an obvious motivation
for Alice to enter a blind quantum computation together
with Bob is to unload the computational task of com-
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puting f without having to compromise the privacy of
her input. One could easily imagine this occurring in a
Grid architecture, or in any client-server relation with
a mistrusted server retaining the computational power.
To make things more precise, suppose there were only
a handful of fully operational large-scale quantum com-
puters in the world, and some hungry academic decided
to make use of her timeshare as scientist to crack some
Swiss bank’s RSA private key x. The hungry academic
(Alice) will surely want to keep x secret from the au-
thorities handling the quantum computer (Bob), so that
she does not get suspected when subsequent international
money transfers come to top up her meager income. But
there may be other reasons to enter a blind computa-
tion protocol than mere computational power asymme-
try. For instance Bob may possess some trapdoor infor-
mation about the otherwise well-known function f . Or
perhaps x may represent some mobile agent’s code which
ought to be protected against the malicious host upon
which it runs. Others may see blind quantum computa-
tion as a somewhat philosophical issue: Is it possible to
carry out some work for someone whilst being prevented
from knowing what the work consists in?
In the classical setting, blind computation has first
been studied by Feigenbaum [6]. It was shown that for
some functions f , an instance x can be encrypted by
z = Ek(x) in such a way that Alice can recover f(x)
efficiently from k and f(z). The construction cannot be
extended easily to general classes of functions. In particu-
lar, blind computation of the discrete logarithm function
(DLF) was shown possible but no blind computation of
the RSA factoring function (FACF) is known. The infi-
nite complexity hierarchy P ⊆ NP = NP ∅ ⊆ NPNP ⊆
. . . ⊆ NPNP .
.NP
⊆ . . . (where NPC stands for the class
of language recognizable in non-deterministic polynomial
2time provided access to an oracle for problems of class C)
is called the polynomial-time hierarchy. It is widely be-
lieved that every level in the polynomial-time hierarchy
is strictly contained in the next one. However, proving or
disproving this statement would be a major breakthrough
in complexity theory. Abadi, Feigenbaum, and Kilian[1]
have shown that no NP-hard problem can be computed
blindly unless the polynomial-time hierarchy collapses at
the third level. We conclude that it is very unlikely that
any NP-hard problem can be computed blindly in the
classical setting.
Even when computational assumptions are invoked
[10], none of the currently known classical blind com-
putation protocols applies to general classes of functions.
Rather they take advantage of specific algebraic prop-
erties of particular functions. These constructions rely
upon encryptions that are, in some sense, homomorphic
with respect to function f . Clearly, very natural candi-
dates for f are not known to have this property like for
FACF. It is not surprising that such stringent require-
ments do not necessarily hold when Bob is running a
quantum computer.
In this paper as in[1, 6], we are concerned with uncon-
ditional security, that is we do not make any computa-
tional assumptions upon eavesdropper Bob. Although we
give Bob the opportunity to gain some Shannon informa-
tion I about Alice’s input x, we ensure that Bob’s eaves-
dropping gets detected by Alice with a probability which
rapidly increases with I. Any server Bob who wants to
remain in business should clearly avoid such an a pos-
teriori detection. Our goal consists of finding protocols
for blind computation for which a good tradeoff between
Bob’s ability to avoid being detected and the amount of
Shannon information about Alice’s input can be estab-
lished. Almost privacy was recently studied by Klauck
[9] in a two-party computation setting which differs from
the asymmetric scenario imposed by blind computations.
Moreover, the security was only considered with respect
to passive adversaries. We want our solution to apply
to a wider class of functions than the one considered in
the classical setting while being resistant to active adver-
saries. As far as we can tell, blind quantum computation
has not been studied as such so far.
In section II we present the basic ideas of our blind
quantum computation protocol, as well as the reasons
which limit their use to a certain class of functions. In
section III we review and adapt a recent result in the
Information versus Disturbance tradeoff literature. In
section IV we formalize the protocol and give a proof
of its security. We conclude in section V and mention
possible extensions of this work.
II. PRINCIPLES OF A SOLUTION
Let us now explain the basic principles underlying
our blind quantum computation protocol. Suppose Al-
ice wants Bob to compute f(x) whilst keeping x secret.
Moreover suppose Bob possesses a quantum computer
which implements f , i.e. he is able to implement a uni-
tary transform U such that U |q〉|0〉= |q〉|f(q)〉 for all in-
puts, q. In order to achieve her purpose Alice could hide
her true input |x〉 amongst superpositions of other poten-
tial inputs |q〉+i|q
′〉√
2
(which we later refer to as ‘quantum
decoys’) and send all this to Bob for him to execute U .
Now if Bob attempts a measure so as to determine |x〉
he will run the risk of collapsing the superpositions. Al-
ice may detect such a tampering when she retrieves her
results. The above suggestion has a weakness however:
Alice is not returned |q〉+i|q
′〉√
2
, but
U
|q〉+ i|q′〉√
2
|0〉 = |q; f(q)〉+ i|q
′; f(q′)〉√
2
,
the result of Bob’s computation upon the superposition
Alice had sent. Since Alice does not want to compute f
herself she is in general unable to check upon the integrity
of such states. To get an intuition of why this is consider
the effects of tracing out the result register whenever f(q)
is different from f(q′).
Tr2(
|q; f(q)〉+ i|q′; f(q′)〉〈q; f(q)| − i〈q′; f(q′)|
2
)
=
(|q〉〈q|Tr(|f(q)〉〈f(q)|) − i|q〉〈q′|Tr(|f(q)〉〈f(q′)|)
+ i|q′〉〈q|Tr(|f(q′)〉〈f(q)|) + |q′〉〈q′|Tr(|f(q′)〉〈f(q′)|))/2
=
|q〉〈q| + |q′〉〈q′|
2
In other words once such a trace-out has been performed
the state is either |q〉 with 0.5 probability, or |q′〉 with
0.5 probability, i.e. it makes no difference whether Bob
performed a measurement in the computational basis or
not.
There are many computational problems, however, for
which this obstacle can be circumvened. For example say
f takes composite numbers into the list of their integer
factors. Then Alice can easily (at the cost of a few multi-
plications) prepare several input-output pairs {(q, f(q))}.
Thus if Alice hides her true input |x〉 amongst superposi-
tions |q〉+i|q
′〉√
2
generated in this manner, she will later be
able to check whether |q;f(q)〉+i|q
′;f(q′)〉√
2
are indeed being
returned. Formally the idealized class of functions for
which our protocol will work is defined as follows:
Definition 1 (Random verifiable functions) Let S
and S′ denote two finite sets. A function f : S → S′
is random verifiable if and only if there exists, for all N ,
an efficient probabilistic process which generates N input-
output pairs {(q, f(q))} and such that the inputs (the q’s)
are uniformly distributed in S.
There are several promised problems for which we can
define functions that are random verifiable. Consider the
language RSA-composite which contains natural num-
bers of a fixed size that can be expressed by the product
3of two primes of the same size. The function f that
returns the prime factors is also random verifiable. In
this case, f can be computed efficiently on a quantum
computer but not, as far as we know, on a classical com-
puter. Another example can be obtained from the graph
isomorphism problem. Let Le,v be the set of all pairs
of isomorphic graphs with e edges and v vertices. We
define function f : Le,v 7→ Se, where Se is the set of all
permutations among v elements, as f(G0, G1) = σ such
that σ(G0) = G1. It is easy to verify that f is random
verifiable. The following efficient classical computation
does the job:
• Pick a random permutation σ ∈ Se,
• Generate a random graph G0 with e edges and v
vertices,
• Output ((G0, σ(G0)), σ).
Although f is random verifiable by an efficient classical
algorithm, it is not known whether even a quantum com-
puter can evaluate f efficiently.
In this paper, we provide a blind quantum computation
protocol for random verifiable functions together with a
thorough security analysis. The cheat-sensitive security
achieved relies upon the laws of physics only. It is ex-
pressed using the vocabulary of information theory. As
was hinted in this section our analysis will crucially de-
pend upon the tradeoff between Bob’s information gain
about Alice’s true input (a canonical basis state) and the
disturbance he induces upon superpositions of potential
inputs (pairwise superpositions of canonical basis states).
III. INFORMATION GAIN VERSUS
DISTURBANCE TRADEOFF
Say Alice draws out a state from an ensemble of quan-
tum states, sends it to Bob, and later retrieves it. How
much information can Bob learn about the state, and
what, then, is the probability that Alice can detect Bob’s
eavesdropping? Questions of Information Gain versus
Disturbance tradeoff were first investigated by Fuchs and
Peres [7], who considered a seemingly simple scenario
involving two equiprobable non-orthogonal pure states.
But the formula they obtained is relatively complex and
the methods employed are somewhat difficult to export to
our setting. In order to construct a blind quantum com-
putation protocol we needed to quantify the disturbance
upon pairwise superpositions of n-dimensional canonical
basis states, as induced when Bob seeks to learn infor-
mation about the canonical basis. A tradeoff formula for
this problem was given in [3]. Proposition 1 rephrases
this result in terms of induced fidelity and letting Bob
and Alice be the same person.
Scenario 1 (One quantum decoy) Consider a quan-
tum channel for transmitting n-dimensional systems hav-
ing canonical orthonormal basis {|j〉}.
Suppose Alice’s message words are drawn out of the
canonical ensemble {(1/n, |j〉)}j=1..n, whilst her quan-
tum decoys are drawn out of the pairing ensemble
{(1/n2, |j〉+i|k〉√
2
)}. Alice sends, over the quantum chan-
nel, either a message word or a decoy, which she later
retrieves.
Whenever she sends a quantum decoy |j〉+i|k〉√
2
she
later measures the retrieved system with {Pintact =( |j〉+i|k〉√
2
)( 〈j|−i〈k|√
2
)
, Ptamper = I−Pintact} so as to check
for tampering.
Suppose Bob is eavesdropping the quantum channel, and
has an interest in determining Alice’s message words.
FIG. 1: One quantum decoy.
A : Draw t in T = {(p, go), (1− p, nogo)}
A : If t = go draw s = m inM = {(1/n, |j〉)}j=1..n
A : If t = nogo draw s = d in D = {(1/n2, |j〉 + i|k〉√
2
)}
A : s −→ B
B : Draw x, s′ in X,S = {(||Mxs||2, |x〉 ⊗Mxs/||Mxs||}x
with {Mx} a generalized measurement.
B : s′ −→ A
A : If t = go draw y in Y = {(0, tamp), (1, notamp)}
A : If t = nogo draw y in
Y = {(||Ptampers′||2, tamp), (||Pintacts′||2, notamp)}
with Ptamper = I − Pintact, Pintact = ss†.
Proposition 1 (One quantum decoy)
Referring to Scenario 1 and its formalization in Figure
1, suppose Bob performs an attack such that, whenever a
message word gets sent, he is able to identify which with
probability G (mean estimation fidelity).
Then, whenever a quantum decoy gets sent, the proba-
bility F (induced fidelity) of Bob’s tampering not being
detected by Alice is bounded above under the following
tight inequality:
F ≤ 1
2
+
1
2n
(√
G+
√
(n− 1)(1−G)
)2
(1)
For optimal attacks G varies from 1
n
to 1 as F varies
from 1 to 12+
1
2n .
Now imagine that Scenario 1 gets repeated N times
round, and that Alice happens to send only decoys.
Scenario 2 (N Quantum decoys)
Step 0. Alice prepares a pool of N + 1 quantum states
consisting of one message word together with N quantum
decoys.
Step 1. Alice sends Bob one quantum state drawn at
4random amongst those remaining in the pool.
Step 2. Alice awaits to retrieve the quantum state she
sent.
Step 3. If Alice sent a quantum decoy she measures the
retrieved system so as to check for tampering.
Step 4. If the pool is empty Alice stops the protocol, else
she proceeds again with Step 1.
Step 5. Alice publicly announces the position p at which
she sent her message word.
This scenario is formalized in Figure 2.
FIG. 2: N quantum decoys / individual attacks
A : draw p in P = {(1/(N + 1), i), }i=0...N
For r = 0 . . . N :
A : If r 6= p draw t in T = {(1, go), (0, nogo)}
else draw t in T = {(0, go), (1, nogo)}
A : If t = go draw s = m inM = {(1/n, |j〉)}j=1..n
A : If t = nogo draw s = d in
D = {(1/n2, |j〉 + i|k〉√
2
)}
A : s −→ B
B : Draw xr, s
′ in
X,S = {(||M (r)x s||2, |x〉 ⊗M (r)x s/||M (r)x s||}r
with, for all r, {M (r)x }
a gen. mesurement upon a bipartite system.
B : s′ −→ A
A : If t = go draw yr in
Y = {(0, tamp), (1, notamp)}
A : If t = nogo draw yr in
Y = {(||Ptampers′||2, tamp), (||Pintactv||2, notamp)}
with Ptamper = I− Pintact, Pintact = ss†.
A : p −→ B
B : guess = fp(x0, . . . , xN)
Corollary 1 (N quantum decoys/individual attacks)
Referring to Referring to Scenario 2, suppose Bob only
performs individual attacks, i.e. independent of each
other at each round, as formalized in Figure 2.
The probability of Bob reaching round m (0 ≤ m ≤ N)
without being caught tampering is bounded above under
the following tight inequality:
p(Bob reaches m) ≤
m−1∏
i=1,i6=p
F (Gi) (2)
where Gi stands for Bob’s mean estimation fidelity, if p
is announced equal to i, about the message word sent at
round p.
Proof. Within the for loop of Figure 2 the scenario
which gets repeated is exactly that of Figure 1, for which
Proposition 1 applies independently at each round. ✷
In the above scenario Bob’s attacks are somewhat
memoryless. Bob’s measurements do not depend upon
previous outcomes nor upon any ancilla quantum system
which he might keep throughout the protocol. This is
what enables us to apply Proposition 1 at the level of each
individual transmission [3], i.e. to assume that that the
probabilities {p(Bob passing round i) = F (Gi)}i=1..N
are independent from each other and hence that that
Bob’s chances of not being detected at all are bounded
by
∏
i=1..N F (Gi).
Now say Bob was to keep an ancillary quantum sys-
tem entangled with a quantum decoy sent at a previ-
ous round, and then perform a coherent quantum mea-
surement upon another quantum decoy and the ancillary
quantum system at a later round – could this correlate
his probabilities of getting caught in a favorable manner?
We argue that it is not so in the following conjecture, by
making use of a standard argument. Formal proofs of
probabilistic security protocols are known to be an ex-
tremely delicate matter requiring delicate notions of pro-
cess equivalences. In quantum information theory such
rigorous frameworks have not yet appeared and seem to
be needed here – we will only provide the reader with a
number of intuitions which strongly support our state-
ment.
Conjecture 1 (N quantum decoys/coherent attacks)
Referring to Scenario 2, suppose Bob performs general
attacks, i.e. which may depend from each other at every
round, as formalized in Figure 3.
The probability of Bob reaching round m (0 ≤ m ≤ N)
without being caught tampering is bounded above under
the following tight inequality:
p(Bob reaches m) ≤
m−1∏
i=1,i6=p
F (Gi)
where Gi stands for Bob’s mean estimation fidelity, if p
is announced equal to i, about the message word sent at
round p.
The following arguments support our claim. Note that in
this Figure 3 we allow Bob to perform the most general
attack possible: his generalized measurements {M (r)x }
depend upon the round r; they may entangle the an-
cillary quantum system a to the state sent by Alice s for
later use (thus the systems a′ and s′ may be entangled);
they may depend upon previous measurement outcomes
via the contents of the ancillary quantum system a; or
they could keep a entangled but unmeasured until the
final round provided that for r < N the statistics of
{M (r)x } do not depend on a. We now reason by con-
tradiction.
Suppose p(Bob reaches m) >
∏m−1
i=1,i6=p F (Gi). Then
5FIG. 3: N quantum decoys / coherent attacks
A : draw p in P = {(1/(N + 1), i), }i=0...N
B : a = ψ
For r = 0 . . . N :
A : If r 6= p draw t in T = {(1, go), (0, nogo)}
else draw t in T = {(0, go), (1, nogo)}
A : If t = go draw s = m inM = {(1/n, |j〉)}j=1..n
A : If t = nogo draw s = d in
D = {(1/n2, |j〉 + i|k〉√
2
)}
A : s −→ B
B : Draw xr, s
′, a′ in
X,S, A = {(||M (r)x sa||2, |x〉 ⊗M (r)x sa/||M (r)x sa||}r
with, for all r, {M (r)x }
a gen. mesurement upon a bipartite system.
B : s′ −→ A
A : If t = go draw yr in
Y = {(0, tamp), (1, notamp)}
A : If t = nogo draw yr in
Y = {(||Ptampers′||2, tamp), (||Pintactv||2, notamp)}
with Ptamper = I− Pintact, Pintact = ss†.
B : a = a′
A : p −→ B
B : guess = fp(x0, . . . , xN)
there exists a k for which
p(Bob reaches k) ≤
k−1∏
i=1,i6=p
F (Gi) and
p(Bob reaches k+1) >
k∏
i=1,i6=p
F (Gi).
For such a k we thus have
p(Bob reaches k+1|Bob reaches k) > F (Gk). (3)
In other words Bob, on the kth round, due to the state
of the ancillary system a at this round, is capable of col-
lecting mean estimation Gk about a message word whilst
remaining undetected with probability more than F (Gk)
upon a quantum decoy. However a is absolutely uncor-
related with s for our purpose, because:
• the quantum decoys and the message words are
undistinguishable since (1/n2)
∑
jk(|j〉+ i|k〉)(〈j|−
i〈k|) = (1/n)∑i |i〉〈i|. Hence a cannot hold any in-
formation about whether the message word is sent
at round k;
• the quantum decoys are picked up independently
from one another and independently from the mes-
sage words, hence if the message word is sent at
round k, a does not hold any complementary in-
formation about the message word and does not
modify Gk;
• the quantum decoys are picked up independently
from one another and independently from the mes-
sage words, hence if a quantum decoy is sent at
round k, a does not hold any complementary infor-
mation about the subspace of the quantum decoy
which needs to be preserved and hence does not
modify F (Gk).
In other words Bob could have, for the purpose of
optimizing his information gain versus disturbance
tradeoff at round k, come up with just as good an a
by playing the first k − 1 rounds of the protocol with
Charlie instead. Hence the situation at round k is in
contradiction with Proposition 1. ⊠
The next section also makes use of the following math-
ematical result, whose direct proof was shown to us by
Prof. Frank Kelly.
Lemma 1 (Concavity of circular products)
Consider f : [0, 1] → [0, 1] a concave, continuous
function and {xi}i=1...N+1 a set of real numbers in the
interval [0, 1].
Suppose the sum t =
∑N+1
i=1 xi is fixed. We have
1
N + 1
N+1∑
p=1
( i=N+1∏
i=1,i6=p
f(xi)
)
≤ f( t
N + 1
)N
.
Proof. By definition of concavity one has
1
2
(
f(x1) + f(x2)
) ≤ f(x1 + x2
2
)
(4)
and f(x1)f(x2) ≤ f
(x1 + x2
2
)2
, (5)
where the latter equation trivially derives from
f(x1)f(x2) ≤
(
f(x1)+f(x2)
2
)2
. Let us now show that
1
N + 1
N+1∑
p=1
i=N+1∏
i=1,i6=p
f(xi) ≤ 1
N + 1
N+1∑
p=1
i=N+1∏
i=1,i6=p
f(yi), (6)
where y1 = y2 =
x1+x2
2 and yi = xi for i = 3 . . .N + 1.
This result is in fact obtained by combining (summing)
two inequalities:
(
f(x1) + f(x2)
)N+1∏
i=3
f(xi) ≤
(
f(y1) + f(y2)
)N+1∏
i=3
f(yi)
f(x1)f(x2)
N+1∑
p=3
i=N+1∏
i=3,i6=p
f(xi) ≤ f(y1)f(y2)
N+1∑
p=3
i=N+1∏
i=3,i6=p
f(yi)
6where former stems from Equation (4) and f(x) posi-
tive, whilst the latter stems from Equation (5) and f(x)
positive.
Equation (6) expresses the fact that, whenever two el-
ements xi and xj , i 6= j are replaced by their mean, the
value of
pi(x) ≡ 1
N + 1
N+1∑
p=1
( i=N+1∏
i=1,i6=p
f(xi)
)
is increased. Now let us define {x(k)} a sequence of
vectors such that x(1) = (x1, x2, . . . , xN+1), and x
(k) is
formed from x(k−1) by replacing both the largest and the
smallest component by their mean. As k goes to infinity
this sequence of vectors tends to x(∞) = ( t
N+1 ,
t
N+1 , . . .).
By Equation (6) we have {pi(x(k))} an increasing se-
quence of real numbers. As k goes to infinity, and since
pi(x) is continuous in x, this sequence of real numbers
tends to
pi(x(∞)) = f
( t
N + 1
)N
.
This limit must therefore provide, for all x having
components summing to t, a tight upper bound on the
value of pi(x). ✷
IV. PROTOCOL AND SECURITY
We are now set to give our blind quantum computation
protocol:
Protocol 1 (Interactive version) Alice wants Bob to
compute f(x) whilst keeping her input x secret. Here f
designates a random verifiable function implemented on
a quantum computer by a unitary evolution U .
Step 0. Alice efficiently computes 2N random input-
solution pairs (q, f(q)) and prepares a pool of N+1 quan-
tum states consisting of her true input |x〉 together with
N quantum decoys |q〉+i|q
′〉√
2
.
Step 1. Alice sends Bob one quantum state |ψ〉 drawn at
random amongst those remaining in the pool.
Step 2. Bob supposedly computes U |ψ〉|0〉 and sends the
result back to Alice.
Step 3. If |ψ〉 was a quantum decoy |q〉+i|q′〉√
2
Alice mea-
sures the retrieved system with
{
Pintact =
1
2
(|q f(q)〉+ i|q′f(q′)〉)(〈q f(q)| − i〈q′f(q′)|)
Ptamper = I− Pintact
}
,
so as to check for tampering. tampering she stops. If
on the other hand |ψ〉 was her true input Alice reads off
f(x).
Step 4. If the pool is empty Alice stops the protocol, else
she proceeds again with Step 1.
Quantum theory is helpful for detecting observation by a
mistrusted party through the induced disturbance. For
this reason quantum cryptography has seen the rise of
cheat-sensitive protocols where ‘Either party may be able
to evade the intended constraints on information transfer
by deviating from these protocols. However, if they do,
there is a non-zero probability that the other will detect
their cheating’ [8]. When the probability of detecting the
cheating is one, the protocol may also be referred to as
cheat-evident [5].
The security of our protocol is cheat-sensitive, as is rig-
orously described and quantified in the following claim.
The security of our protocol may also be referred to as
cheat-evident, in the sense that Alice’s detection proba-
bility tends to 1 in the limit where N tends to infinity.
Moreover for a fixed information gain by Bob, Alice’s de-
tection probability approaches 1 exponentially with N .
Claim 1 (Statement of security) Referring to Pro-
tocol 1 suppose Bob has no a priori information about
Alice’s true input x. Let I ∈ [0, log(n)] be Bob’s mutual
information about Alice’s true input x at the end of the
protocol. Let D ∈ [0, (1/2)N ] be the probability of Alice
detecting Bob’s tampering. Provided that Bob makes only
individual attacks, the protocol ensures that ∀G ∈ [ 1
n
, 1],
[
I = log(n) + log(G) ⇒ D ≥ 1− F (G)N ].
Hence we have equivalently
D ≥ 1− F (2I−log(n))N .
Proof.
We prove that the claim holds for a weakened form of
Protocol 1, where we add:
Step 5. Alice publicly announces the position in which
she sent her true input |x〉.
Until this stage, however, Bob has no means of know-
ing at which round true input |x〉 was sent. This is
because we have assumed he has no a priori knowledge
about the true input. In his view the state was drawn
from the canonical ensemble {(1/n, |j〉)}j=1..n, whilst the
quantum decoys were drawn from the pairing ensemble
{(1/n2, |j〉+i|k〉√
2
)}, but the two are undistinguishable for
they both have density matrix I/n. We are, therefore, in
the precise case of Corollary 1. Without loss of generality
we can assume Bob’s attack yields him mean estimation
fidelity Gi about Alice’s true input whenever the position
is later announced equal to i. Let G =
∑
pGp/(N + 1).
First we prove that [I = log(n) + log(G)⇒ G ≥ G].
Say the true input is at position p. In this situation
Bob’s best chance of guessing the true input is Gp (by
definition) and thus his Shannon uncertainty Hp about
Alice’s true input is bounded as follows
Hp ≡
∑
−p(x|Bob’s outcome) log(p(x|Bob’s outcome))
≥ −⌊ 1
Gp
⌋Gp log(Gp)− (1− ⌊ 1
Gp
⌋Gp) log(1− ⌊ 1
Gp
⌋Gp)
≥ − log(Gp).
7The RHS of the last line is often referred to as the ‘min-
entropy’ sometimes denotedH∞ and is commonly used to
bound uncertainties in the above manner (i.e. Shannon
uncertainty is always at least H∞). As a consequence
Bob’s mutual information Ip satisfies
Ip ≤ log(n) + log(Gp).
Averaging over all possible positions p = 1 . . .N+1 Bob’s
mutual information satisfies
I =
N+1∑
p=1
1
N + 1
Ip
≤ log(n) +
N+1∑
p=1
1
N + 1
log(Gp)
≤ log(n) + log(G)
where the third line was obtained using the concavity of
x 7→ log(x). Hence we have
I = log(n) + log(G) ≤ log(n) + log(G).
Since x 7→ log(x) is crescent we conclude that G ≤ G.
Second we prove that [G ≥ G⇒ D ≥ 1− F (G)N ].
Since we have assumed individual attacks Corollary 1
applies, and so Bob is undetected with probability
p(undetected|p) ≤
N+1∏
i=1,i6=p
F (Gi).
Let us now average the above over all possible positions
p = 1 . . .N + 1. The probability that Bob’s tampering
remains undetected by Alice satisfies
p(undetected) =
1
N + 1
N+1∑
p=1
p(undetected|p)
≤ 1
N + 1
N+1∑
p=1
( N+1∏
i=1,i6=p
F (Gi)
)
≤ F (G)N
D ≥ 1− F (G)N .
where the third line was obtained using Lemma 1 upon
the concave, continuous function x 7→ F (x). Since x 7→
1− F (x)N is crescent and G ≥ G we conclude that
D ≥ 1− F (G)N ≥ 1− F (G)N .
✷
Protocol 1 requires N+1 communications between Al-
ice and Bob. One could suggest a modification whereby
Alice would send Bob her whole pool (as prepared in Step
0 ), and later proceed to check upon the integrity of each
element of the pool which Bob returns, apart from her
true input. Formally this yields the following protocol:
Protocol 2 (Non-interactive version) Alice wants
Bob to compute f(x) whilst keeping her input x secret.
Here f designates a random verifiable function imple-
mented on a quantum computer by a unitary evolution
U .
Step 0. Alice efficiently computes 2N random input-
solution pairs (q, f(q)) and prepares a pool of N + 1
quantum states consisting of her true input |x〉 together
with N quantum decoys |q〉+i|q
′〉√
2
.
Step 1. Alice sends Bob the large quantum state⊗N+1
i=1 |ψi〉 consisting of a random permutation of all
elements of the pool.
Step 2. Bob supposedly computes
⊗N+1
i=1 U |ψi〉|0〉 and
sends the result back to Alice.
Step 3. For each location i, if |ψi〉 was a quantum decoy
|q〉+i|q′〉√
2
Alice measures
{
Pintact =
1
2
(|q; f(q)〉+ i|q′; f(q′)〉)(〈q; f(q)| − i〈q′; f(q′)|)
Ptamper = I− Pintact
}
.
so as to check for tampering. If on the other hand |ψi〉
was her true input Alice reads off f(x).
When Bob is restricted to individual attacks (non-
coherent attacks, i.e. Bob measures each quantum state
in the pool individually) then Claim 1 holds also for Pro-
tocol 2. We omit the proof of this since it is similar, and
in fact simpler than the one given for Protocol 1. Now
suppose Conjecture 1 was verified. This would immedi-
ately entail that Claim 1 holds also for coherent attacks
for Protocol 1. Hence we believe that Protocol 1 can re-
sist the most general attack. A thought-provoking ques-
tion is whether this is still the case of Protocol 2. Is it
the case that interactivity contributes, to some extent, to
a limitation of Bob’s possible attacks?
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have investigated the possibility of having some-
one else carrying out the evaluation of a function for you
without letting him learn anything about your input. We
gave a blind computation protocol for the class of func-
tions which admit an efficient procedure to generate ran-
dom input-output pairs. The protocol relies upon quan-
tum physical information gain versus disturbance trade-
offs [3] to achieve cheat-sensitive security against individ-
ual attacks: whenever the server gathers log(n) + log(G)
bits of Shannon information about the input, he must
get caught with probability at least 1−F (G)N (where n
denotes the size of the input and N is a security param-
eter). Moreover the server cannot distinguish a weary
client who uses the blind computation protocol (sending
one true input amongst N decoys) from a normal client
who simply makes repeated use of the server (sending
N + 1 true inputs). Thus if the server wanted to deny
8his services to suspected users of the protocol, he would
also have to refuse the normal clients. We have conjec-
tured that the same security properties hold for general,
coherent attacks.
Our protocol could be improved in several directions.
In terms of costs one may hope to reduce the set of quan-
tum gates needed by Alice to prepare her transmissions
[4]; lower the size of the transmissions; lower the number
of rounds required. We leave it as an open problem to
find the security properties of the non-interactive version
of our protocol when Bob is allowed coherent attacks.
In terms of functionality one may wish to achieve tam-
per prevention (preventing Bob from learning about x
ever) rather than tamper detection (preventing Bob from
learning about x without being detected, i.e. cheat-
sensitiveness). Protocol 1 provides the latter to some
degree, since its interactivity allows Alice to avoid send-
ing her true input x whenever she detects tampering upon
her quantum decoys in the previous rounds. However we
have not provided an analysis for a tamper-prevention-
like security property. Another challenge would be to
extend/identify the class of functions admitting a blind
quantum computation protocol. This may have conse-
quences in quantum complexity theory, as was the case
in the classical setting [1]. For instance if one was to
prove that the blind quantum computation protocol had
no interest as a secure way of discharging Alice compu-
tationally - because all the random verifiable functions
turn out to be easy to perform on a quantum computer
- then random verifiability would impose itself as an ele-
gant property for the quantum polynomial class.
Acknowledgments
P.J.A would like to thank Prof. Frank Kelly for his
self-contained proof of Lemma 1, Dr. Anuj Dawar for
proof-reading, EPSRC, Marconi, the Cambridge Euro-
pean and Isaac Newton Trusts, and the European Union
Marie Curie Fellowship scheme for financial support. L.
S. would like to thank Ivan Damg˚ard for enlightening
discussions and the EU project PROSECCO for finan-
cial support. Both would like to thank the anonymous
referee for important comments.
[1] M. Abadi, J. Feigenbaum, J. Kilian, On Hiding Informa-
tion from an Oracle, Journal of Computer and System
Sciences, 39(1), 21-50, (1989).
[2] M. Abadi, J. Feigenbaum, Secure Circuit Evaluation,
Journal of Cryptology, 2(1), 1-12, (1990).
[3] P. Arrighi, Quantum Decoys, Int. J. of Quantum Infor-
mation, 2(3), 341-351, (2004).
[4] A.M. Childs, Secure assisted quantum computation, tech.
report MIT-CTP 3211, arXiv:quant-ph/0111046.
[5] R. Colbeck, A. Kent, Variable bias coin tossing: conspir-
ing with fate to save the fate, arXiv:quant-ph/0508149.
[6] J. Feigenbaum, Encrypting Problem Instances, or, ...,
Can You Take Advantage of Someone Without Having
To Trust Him?, Proc. CRYPTO’85, 477-488, Springer,
(1986).
[7] C. Fuchs, Information Gain vs. State Disturbance in
Quantum Theory, arXiv:quant-ph/9611010 and C. Fuchs,
A. Peres, arXiv:quant-ph/9512023.
[8] L. Hardy, A. Kent, Cheat sensitive quantum bit commit-
ment, Phys. Rev. Lett, 92, 157901, (2004).
[9] H. Klauck, On Quantum and Approximate Privacy, Proc.
of the 19th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects
of Computer Science, LNCS, 2285, 335-365, Springer,
(2002).
[10] T. Sander, C.F. Tschudin Protecting Mobile Agents
Against Malicious Hosts, Mobile Agents and Security,
LNCS, 1419, 44-61, Springer, (1998).
[11] A.C. Yao, How to Generate and Exchange Secrets, Proc.
of the 27th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Com-
puter Science, 162-167, IEEE Computer Society Press,
(1986).
